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Silvar v. Dist. Ct., 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 25, 129 P.3d 682 (2006)1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – VOID FOR VAUGNESS DOCTRINE & 
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE 
Summary 
 Lani Lisa Silvar (“Silvar”) was arrested in Clark County, Nevada for violating 
Clark County Ordinance (“CCO”) 12.08.030.  While Silvar was standing on the corner of 
Fremont and Atlantic Street, a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department detective 
approached her in an unmarked vehicle.  Silvar entered the detective’s vehicle and 
allegedly asked the detective if he was “dating,” a term synonymous with seeking 
prostitution.  After the detective responded in the affirmative, Silvar became nervous and 
attempted to exit the vehicle.  The detective identified himself and gave Silvar an 
opportunity to explain her actions.  Silvar responded that she was working as a prostitute, 
recognized the detective from a previous solicitation arrest, and decided not to proceed. 
 The detective arrested Silvar and she was charged with loitering for the purpose 
of prostitution in violation of CCO 12.08.30 which states: 
It is unlawful for any person to loiter in or near any public place or 
thoroughfare in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the 
purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting for or procuring another to 
commit an act of prostitution. 
 Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining 
whether such purpose is manifested are that such person repeatedly 
beckons to, stops, attempts to stop or engages persons passing by in 
conversation, or repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle 
operators by hailing, waving of arms or any other bodily gesture.  No 
arrest shall be made for a violation of this section unless the arresting 
officer first affords such person an opportunity to explain such conduct, 
and no one shall be convicted of violating this section if it appears at trial 
that the explanation given was true and disclosed a lawful purpose.2 
     Silvar moved to dismiss the complaint against her arguing that CCO 12.08.30 was 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.  The Las Vegas Justice Court dismissed the 
complaint on that basis.  The district court reversed and remanded, upholding the 
constitutionality of the ordinance.  Silvar appealed.   
The Nevada Supreme Court found that the ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague and overbroad and therefore void.   
 
                                                 
1 By Melissa Waite 
2 Clark County Ordinance 12.08.30. 
  
Issue and Disposition 
Issue 
Is Clark County’s prostitution loitering ordinance unconstitutionally vague and 
overbroad? 
Disposition 
Yes.  Clark County’s prostitution loitering ordinance is unconstitutionally vague 
and overbroad.  The ordinance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to provide 
notice such that a person of ordinary intelligence would understand what conduct is 
prohibited and because the ordinance lacks specific standards.  The ordinance is 
unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes conduct that is constitutionally 
protected and because it contains no specific intent element.   
Commentary 
State of the Law Before Silvar  
 While the Nevada Supreme Court has not previously considered the precise issue 
of the constitutionality of a prostitution loitering ordinance, the court has articulated 
standards for determining the constitutionality of an ordinance which is vague or 
overbroad.  The court in Sheriff Washoe County v. Burdg articulated the void-for-
vagueness doctrine finding that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it, “(1) fails to 
provide notice sufficient to enable persons of ordinary intelligence to understand what 
conduct is prohibited and (2) lacks specific standards, thereby encouraging, authorizing, 
or even failing to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”3  The court in City 
of Las Vegas v. District Court articulated the overbreadth doctrine stating that the 
doctrine, "provides that a law is void on its face if it 'sweeps within its ambit other 
activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of' protective First 
Amendment rights, such as the right to free expression or association." 4 
 
Additionally, the court has considered the constitutionality of other loitering 
ordinances.  In State v. Richard, the court held that certain state and municipal loitering 
laws, which criminalize loitering on private property when an individual has no "lawful 
business with the owner or occupant thereof" were unconstitutionally vague.5  The court 
reasoned that the statute and ordinances were void for vagueness because they failed to 
inform the public of what conduct was prohibited and they “fail to provide law 
                                                 
3 118 Nev. 853, 857, 59 P.3d 484, 487 (2002) (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 
1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983)). 
4 118 Nev. 859, 863 n. 14, 59 P.3d 477, 480 n.14 (2002) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97, 
60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940)). 
5 108 Nev. 626, 629, 836 P.2d 622, 624 (1992). 
  
enforcement officials with proper guidelines to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.”6   
Other Jurisdictions 
 Many other jurisdictions have considered the constitutionality of prostitution 
loitering ordinances. 
 A. Unconstitutionally Vague Due to Lack of Adequate Notice of Prohibited 
Conduct 
The Ohio Court of Appeals in Cleveland v. Mathis, held that a prostitution 
loitering ordinance was void for vagueness.7  The court pointed to the fact that the 
ordinance listed circumstances that "may" be considered in determining whether an 
individual manifested a purpose to engage in, solicit, or procure sexual activity for hire.8  
Additionally, the court recognized that the ordinance used the word ‘among’ which 
indicates there were other circumstances to form the basis of an arrest and conviction.9  
The court concluded that this statute impermissibly allowed factors other than those 
enumerated in the ordinance to be considered and thus was void because it did not give 
an ordinary person notice of what conduct was prohibited.10 
 B. Unconstitutionally Vague Due to Lack of Adequate Law Enforcement 
Guidelines 
The Supreme Court of Alaska in Brown v. Municipality of Anchorage, struck 
down a prostitution loitering ordinance in part because a formerly convicted prostitute 
could be convicted for loitering without committing any other overt act.11  The court 
concluded that, even though such loitering suggests the intent to engage in prostitution, 
this was not an adequate guideline.12  The ordinance’s vagueness left too much discretion 
in the hands of the police, who could apply it arbitrarily.13 
 
In Wyche v. State, the Supreme Court of Florida found that the entire list of 
suggestive circumstances listed in a prostitution loitering ordinance was not exhaustive 
and “leaves much to individual officers’ discretion,” which “encourages the arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement of the law.”14  Further, the court reasoned that, “Many 
innocent people saunter on the streets and call to friends.”15  Because this type of 
                                                 
6 Id.  




11 584 P.2d 35, 37 (Alaska 1978).  See also Gates v. Municipal Court, 185 Cal. Rptr. 330 (Cal. 1982) (a city 
ordinance proscribing loitering for purpose of soliciting an act of prostitution left enforcement to subjective 
and potentially arbitrary evaluation of law enforcement officers was unconstitutionally vague). 
12 Brown, 584 P.2d at 37. 
13 Id. 
14 619 So.2d 231, 237 (Fla. 1993). 
15 Id. 
  
behavior would be included under the ordinance, the court found the ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vague. 
 
In Coleman v. City of Richmond, the Court of Appeals of Virginia found a 
prostitution loitering ordinance which did not require an overt act of solicitation or 
prostitution resulted in a situation where an officer may arrest someone on a mere 
suspicion of future criminality.16  The court concluded that the ordinance vested too much 
discretion in the officers who enforce the ordinance and the ordinance allowed for 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  As a result, the ordinance was void for 
vagueness. 
 
C. Unconstitutionally Overbroad Due to Prohibition of Constitutionally Protected 
Conduct 
 
The court in Wyche, held that an ordinance which allows for arrest and conviction 
for loitering under circumstances merely indicating the possibility of such intent, such as 
beckoning to passersby and waving to motorists is unconstitutionally overbroad.17  The 
court reasoned that these activities frequently occur without any intent to engage in 
criminal activity.  The court found that “[t]he ordinance affects and chills constitutionally 
protected activity.” 
 
Similar ordinances likewise have been invalidated by numerous other courts 
based on the ordinances' potential for punishing innocent conduct.18 
 
 D. Unconstitutionally Overbroad Due to Lack of Specific Intent 
 
A majority of the prostitution loitering ordinances that have been upheld and 
found not to be unconstitutionally overbroad require the element of specific intent.  For 
example, a California statute that required loitering to occur “with the intent to commit 
prostitution” was upheld.19  Similarly, an Ohio ordinance that required that loitering be 
done “for the purpose of engaging in soliciting or procuring sexual activity for hire” was 
also upheld.20  Finally, a Seattle ordinance was upheld which provides that a loitering 
                                                 
16 5 Va. App. 459, 466, 364 S.E.2d 239, 243 (Va. App. 1988). 
17  619 So.2d at 235-36.   
18 See e.g.,  Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974 (D.C. Fla.1983) (a municipal ordinance prohibiting 
loitering for the purpose of prostitution, which prohibited constitutionally protected as well as unprotected 
conduct, was unconstitutionally overbroad.  “[A]nyone standing on the street corner repeatedly talking to 
passers-by, even if they are old friends, could be violating the ordinance."); Profit v. City of Tulsa, 617 
P.2d 250, 251 (Okla. 1980) (An ordinance was found unconstitutionally overbroad where “acts required to 
be done in conjunction with being a known prostitute or pimp are otherwise not criminal in most situations. 
The ordinance reaches beyond conduct which is calculated to harm and could be used to punish conduct 
which is essentially innocent.”); Christian v. City of Kansas City, 710 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) 
("If the circumstances which allegedly reflect one's illicit intentions were held to be well grounded in 
constitutional jurisprudence, this court would have to condone potential arrests and convictions for ... 
window shopping, waiting on the corner for a bus, waving to friends, or hailing a taxicab."). 
19 People v. Pulliam, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 371, 376 (Ct. App. 1998) (upholding Cal. Penal Code § 653.22). 
20 City of Cleveland v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1987) (upholding Cleveland 
Codified Ordinances § 619.11). 
  
violation occurs when a person “intentionally solicits, induces, entices, or procures 
another to commit prostitution.”21  
Effect of Silvar on Current Law 
The court’s opinion in Silvar provides an excellent framework for evaluating 
questions of constitutionality of ordinances or statutes that are potentially vague or 
overbroad.    
The Silvar court noted that prostitution and soliciting are still unlawful acts under 
other applicable Clark County ordinances.  However, because the prostitution loitering 
ordinance is unconstitutional and therefore void, Clark County now lacks an enforceable 
prostitution loitering ordinance. 
Unanswered Questions 
 If Clark County desires an effective prostitution loitering ordinance, a new 
ordinance must be enacted.  The court advises that an example of a prostitution loitering 
statute that adequately satisfies constitutional vagueness and overbreadth concerns is 
found in N.Y. Penal Law § 240.37(2).  This statute states: 
Any person who remains or wanders about in a public place and 
repeatedly beckons to, or repeatedly stops, or repeatedly attempts to stop, 
or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in conversation, or repeatedly 
stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles, or repeatedly interferes with the 
free passage of other persons, for the purpose of prostitution, or of 
patronizing a prostitute as those terms are defined in article two hundred 
thirty of the penal law, shall be guilty of a violation and is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor if such person has previously been convicted of a 
violation of this section or of sections 230.00 or 230.05 of the penal law.22   
 
Although it remains to be seen whether Clark County will enact a new 
prostitution loitering ordinance, this provision can offer guidance in drafting such an 
ordinance and demonstrates the level of detail necessary to avoid issues of vagueness and 
overbreadth. 
Conclusion 
 Clark County’s prostitution loitering ordinance is unconstitutionally vague 
because it fails to provide notice such that a person of ordinary intelligence would 
understand what conduct is prohibited and because the ordinance lacks specific standards.  
Further, the ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it criminalizes conduct 
that is constitutionally protected and because it contains no specific intent element.   
                                                 
21 City of Seattle v. Slack, 784 P.2d 494, 496 (Wash. 1989) (upholding Seattle Mun. Code 12A.10.010(B)). 
22 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.37 (2) (McKinney 2006). 
